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Abstract 
A first-person shooter video game was adapted for the study of choice between smaller 
sooner and larger later rewards.  Participants chose when to fire a weapon that increased in 
damage potential over a short interval.  When the delay to maximum damage was shorter (5 – 
8 s), people showed greater sensitivity to the consequences of their choices than when the delay 
was longer (17 – 20 s).  Participants also evidenced a magnitude effect by waiting proportionally 
longer when the damage magnitudes were doubled for all rewards.  The experiment replicated 
the standard magnitude effect with this new video game preparation over time scales similar to 
those typically used in nonhuman animal studies and without complications due to satiation or 
cost.  
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No one likes to wait, but the willingness to do so certainly depends on the length of the 
wait and what will be received once the wait is over.  In empirical studies of the willingness to 
wait, participants are given a series of choices involving the tradeoff between a smaller 
immediate reward versus a larger delayed reward (for a collection of articles on the topic, see 
Madden & Bickel, 2010).  As the delay to the larger reward increases, people are more likely to 
choose the smaller sooner reward over the larger later one.  In empirical studies of the effect of 
reward magnitude, research has revealed that people demonstrate a greater willingness to wait 
when both the sooner and later outcomes have greater value (Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 
1997; Jimura, Myerson, Hilgard, Braver, & Green, 2009). For example, most people would 
rather have $10 now than $20 in 6 months (the $20 is discounted to less than half its immediate 
value due to the delay), but people are much more likely to wait if the tradeoff is between $1 
million now and $2 million in 6 months. This magnitude effect has been robust in studies of 
humans but difficult to replicate in nonhuman species (e.g., Calvert, Green, & Myerson, 2010; 
Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997).   
It would not be surprising if human and nonhuman species show different behaviors and 
tactics in response to a particular environmental challenge like choosing between smaller sooner 
and larger later outcomes.  Their ecological niches are quite different, their neural machinery 
varies, and their basic biological differences produce dissimilar demands on the importance of 
immediacy (e.g., metabolism, locomotive speed, and prey vulnerability).  Interpreting this 
species difference, however, has been complicated by the fact that human studies typically 
involve hypothetical rewards and imagined delays on the order of days to years (e.g., Estle, 
Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Hinvest & Anderson, 2010; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 
2003; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991), whereas nonhuman studies always involve consumable 
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rewards with very short delays on the order of seconds to minutes (e.g., Green, Myerson, Holt, 
Slevin, & Estle, 2004; Mazur, 1987; Richards et al., 1997).  In two studies involving humans and 
consumable rewards, however, people showed a magnitude effect even when the delays were 
experienced, not hypothetical, and on the order of seconds (Jimura et al., 2009; Logue & King, 
1991).  The use of consumables, however, provides a natural limit on the number of choices 
before participants are satiated.  Jimura et al. and Logue and King’s designs involved fewer than 
20 trials in a session and maximum delays of 60 s.   
The need to use consumable rewards in order to observe discounting across short delays 
seemed odd in light of emerging technologies that may condition people to expect immediate 
outcomes.  Small delays in a computer’s response to a command, the sending of a text message, 
or the loading of a web page prompt common complaints among technology users.  This 
apparent intolerance for small delays in interactions with technology was leveraged by Young, 
Webb, and Jacobs (2011) who recently pioneered a novel video game procedure for studying the 
tradeoff between smaller sooner and larger later rewards.  In the game, people may either fire 
sooner and do little damage or later and do more damage.  The amount of damage increased as 
time passed and reached a maximum after 10 s using a paradigm that they called an escalating 
interest task.  The key independent variable in their method is a parameter that dictates how the 
weapon damage potential (its charge) approaches this maximum. The left side of Figure 1 shows 
the precise variations in recharge acceleration across three values of a parameter, power, that 
alter the recharge behavior, and the right side of Figure 1 shows the resulting rate of damage for 
a consistent waiting time between shots for each of these values.  For power values less than 1.0, 
the maximal damage rate is achieved by waiting the full 10 s; for power values greater than 1.0, 
the maximal damage rate is achieved by firing as rapidly as possible. 
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The advantage to a video game preparation is that it allows the study of delay discounting 
in humans under short delays without a trial limit created by satiation.  This ability to examine 
behavior across many choices allows better study of how choice evolves with time.  The 
drawback to the preparation is that there is only one published study using it (Young et al., 2011) 
which raises questions as to whether behavior in the video game responds to manipulations, like 
a change in magnitude, in a way that is similar to that used in published studies involving 
hypothetical choice or consumables.  
For the purposes of the present study, we wished to determine whether there would be a 
magnitude effect similar to that found in other studies involving humans or if the use of short 
delays and immediate rewards would result in the absence of a magnitude effect like that 
observed in nonhuman species. Furthermore, we wished to determine if the length of the delay to 
the maximum amount would systematically affect performance.  In Young et al.’s (2011) 
previous study, the maximal reward was achieved after 10 s.  Although published studies vary 
quite dramatically in the length of the delay to the larger later outcome, we are unaware of any 
research that has systematically varied this variable between-subject to determine if discount 
behavior changes as a function of the range of delays used (a form of context effect, cf. Percoco 
& Nijkamp, 2009).   
The examination of both the effects of magnitude and the length of the delay would help 
determine whether waiting in the escalating interest task shows the same sensitivity to these 
variables as do hypothetical money choice tasks.  Given that recent research has revealed that 
experience-based decisions can sometimes produce results opposite from those studied using 
described hypothetical choices (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010; Shafir, 
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Reich, Tsur, Erev, & Lotem, 2008), it is imperative that magnitude and delay effects be revisited 
using this paradigm for studying impulsivity.  
In order to assess the magnitude effect, we adapted the Young et al. (2011) video game 
task to assign participants to either the standard magnitude used in their earlier study or a 
condition in which the maximum weapon damage was doubled.  If participants show a 
magnitude effect consistent with prior reports involving hypothetical choice, their behavior 
should reveal longer interresponse times (IRTs) in the double magnitude condition regardless of 
the other variables being manipulated.  In order to examine the effect of the length of the delay 
until maximum value is achieved, participants were assigned a randomly chosen delay between 
5 s and 20 s in order to map out the functional relationship (see Young, Cole, & Sutherland, 
2012).  The manipulation of delay could be accomplished by having the same maximum 
achieved in less time, but doing so produces a situation in which the density of reinforcement 
necessarily increases.  Thus, the maximum damage amount decreased as the delay decreased to 
ensure that the density of reinforcement would be identical across different delays to maximum 
reward if the participant waited the full delay between shots.  This relationship is depicted in 
Figure 2 in which we show the change in damage across four 5 s periods, two 10 s periods, or 
one 20 s period when 5, 10, and 20 s is the assigned delay to maximum damage.  By changing 
the damage potential as a function of the delay to maximum, we ensure that the same total 
damage is done for each of these delay conditions over a 20 s period for participants who wait 
until the maximum is available.   
  Magnitude and Delay to Maximum 7 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 80 undergraduate students enrolled in an introduction to psychology course at 
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale received course credit for their voluntary 
participation. There were 51 women and 27 men; 2 did not report their sex. 
Procedure 
The game world included four levels each containing seven separate regions with each 
region populated by two orcs as described by Young et al. (2011); see http://www.k-
state.edu/psych/research/young/suppmaterial.html for a video clip of game play.  The player’s 
task was to destroy all of the orcs within each game level.  Thus, a game level is isomorphic to a 
block of training in a conventional study of choice. 
The player’s weapon reached its maximum charge after an assigned delay.  Each 
participant experienced the same assigned delay for the entire game.  We used a random 
sampling design in which the delay to maximum charge for each participant was randomly 
chosen from the 5 to 20 s range (uniformly).  The amount of damage a fully charged weapon 
could inflict was varied as a function of the programmed delay in order to hold constant the 
reinforcement density (i.e., average delay) that could be achieved for players waiting for the 
maximum damage.  For the standard magnitude condition (43.33 points per 10 s, Young et al., 
2011), equality was achieved by multiplying this density by the assigned delay to maximum 
charge (5 to 20 s) divided by 10 s.  Thus, for a programmed delay of 5 s, a fully charged shot 
inflicted 21.66 points on the enemy orc (43.33 * 5/10), and for a programmed delay of 20 s, a 
fully charged shot inflicted 86.66 damage points on the enemy orc (43.33 * 20/10).  In the double 
magnitude condition, all damage was doubled.  Half of the participants were assigned to the 
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standard magnitude condition and the other half were assigned to the double magnitude 
condition.  Note that it takes 100 points of damage to destroy a target (2.308 fully-charged shots 
in the standard magnitude condition). 
The amount of damage a weapon inflicted during the delay to maximum charge was 
determined by the power value of that weapon (see Equation 1 of Young et al., 2011).  The 
power value of the weapon changed each time the participant destroyed two orcs.  We used a 
random sampling design in which the power value was randomly chosen from the 0.5 to 1.5 
range (uniformly).  The change in a weapon’s power was accompanied by a 1250 ms three-tone 
sequence with a pitch that was correlated with the new power level with participants told that the 
pitch of the tone indicated the way that their weapon would recharge (higher pitch for higher 
power value). Because there were 14 orcs in each level and the power value changed when 2 orcs 
were destroyed, each player experienced seven power values in each game level.   
After completing the game, participants completed a demographics program which asked 
their sex and self-reported amount of video game play for each of nine types (see Cole, 2011, 
Appendix D).  Amounts of play were solicited on scale of 0 (indicating none) to 6 (indicating 
daily) with the middle of the scale indicating monthly play.   
Results 
All but one of the participants completed all four levels in the allotted time of one hour; 
one participant’s session was terminated in the middle of the second level.  Of the 80 
participants, 78 completed all of the demographics questions.   
Most participants produced a bimodal IRT distribution either firing as quickly as possible 
or waiting until the maximum damage was available (which differed between participants). To 
avoid statistical issues with the bimodal nature of the data, we dichotomized participant behavior 
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into short responses (IRTs less than half of the programmed delay to maximum damage) and 
long responses (IRTs greater than or equal to half of the programmed delay to maximum 
damage) and used a logit link function in a generalized linear mixed effects analysis, thus 
assuming a logistic relationship between our predictors and the likelihood of a long response.  
All responses greater than twice the delay to maximum damage, however, were dropped due to 
their high likelihood of being contaminated by inattention; this criterion resulted in dropping 
1.4% of the responses.  Because behavior in the first level was distinctly different from that in 
the subsequent levels, we treated Level 1 as categorically different from Levels 2 through 4 in 
our analyses. 
Figure 3 shows the mean likelihood of waiting more than half the programmed delay for 
each participant at each experienced power value for the two magnitude conditions; Level 1 
performance is excluded.  The height of the smooth spline fit corresponds to a participant’s 
overall likelihood of waiting (higher lines indicate more waiting) whereas the slope of the line 
signifies whether a participant’s waiting is sensitive to changes in the power value (as it should, 
with higher power values making short IRTs more efficient thus producing a negative slope).  
There were clear individual differences in the overall likelihood of waiting and in sensitivity to 
the manipulation of power.  Furthermore, there is some visual evidence that there was a higher 
proportion of participants who waited for the maximum reward in the double magnitude 
condition than in the standard magnitude condition.  
One of the challenges of analyzing data from free operant procedures with continuous 
predictors is the visual presentation of the results.  Given that some situations (e.g., high values 
of the power parameter) produce many more responses, it is essential that this be considered in 
describing the results to ensure that the graphs are not biased by this oversampling of behavior in 
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some conditions.  This issue is complicated by the fact that some participants produce much 
shorter IRTs than others that can bias graphs by producing means that over-represent the 
behavior of these individuals.  As a result, we statistically sampled from our participants’ 
behavior at each power value and in each level to approximate a balanced design for our figures 
of raw data (Figures 3, 4, and 5).  Our analytical approach involved linear mixed effects 
modeling of the complete data set (Pinheiro & Bates, 2004) which appropriately incorporates the 
sample size imbalances that produce significant problems for traditional general linear modeling 
approaches like ANOVA and regression.  
In our examination of the distribution of a sample of scaled IRTs as a function of 
magnitude, Figure 4 reveals that participants produced bimodal IRTs for both the standard 
magnitude and the double magnitude conditions, but no significant difference between the two in 
Level 1.  In Levels 2 through 4, the lower peak was shifted toward longer IRTs (about 30% of 
the delay to maximum charge) for the double magnitude condition, thus producing longer 
waiting times.   
In the distribution of a sample of scaled IRTs as a function of programmed delay to 
maximum charge (here grouped into four categories only for illustration), Figure 5 shows that 
the shortest delays (5 – 8 s) produced a greater likelihood of waiting the full duration in both 
Level 1 and Levels 2 through 4.  In contrast, the longest delays (17 – 20 s) produced a greater 
likelihood of rapid firing for both Level 1 and Levels 2 through 4.  In Level 1, the intermediate 
delays (9 – 12 s and 13 – 16 s) showed IRT distributions very similar to that for the longest 
delays.  In Levels 2 through 4, the distribution for the 9 – 12 s delays was generally shifted 
toward longer IRTs for the lower mode and the distribution for the 13 – 16 s delays was similar 
to that for the longest delays except with a less pronounced bimodal distribution.   
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In the linear mixed effects analysis, we specified a binomial distribution (thus producing 
zs, not ts, in the later analyses) and centered the continuous predictors in the interactions to avoid 
multicollinearity.  The mixed effects analysis allowed intercepts, level slope effects, and power 
slope effects to vary across participants.  Only those interactions that produced a better model 
(lower AIC) were retained.  A logarithmic relation for delay was used because doing so produced 
a better fit.  The results are shown in Table 1.   
First, participants showed a strong sensitivity to the power manipulation thus replicating 
Young et al. (2011).  Sensitivity was roughly twice as strong in Levels 2 through 4 (b = -2.04) as 
in Level 1 (b = -1.13).  In Level 1, the modeled likelihood of a “long” response (i.e., waiting 
more than half the delay to maximum damage before firing) was 55% for the lowest power value 
of 0.5 and 31% for the highest power value of 1.5 (z = 5.01, p < .01).  This difference was much 
larger in Levels 2 through 4 (73% vs. 28%, z = 10.45, p < .01).    
In the standard magnitude condition (that used by Young et al., 2011), the best fitting 
model shown in Table 1 predicted 40% “long” responses for Levels 2 through 4 whereas in the 
double magnitude condition the model predicted 61% “long” responses (z = 2.71, p < .01, see 
Table 1).  The model revealed no statistically significant difference as a function of overall 
magnitude in Level 1 (41% vs. 44%, z = -.06, p > .25).  These modeled estimates are consistent 
with those shown in Figure 4. 
The overall effects of the length of the delay to maximal damage appeared large (Figure 
5) but were undermined by inconsistency across participants and game level.  In Level 1, the 
model predicted 52% “long” responses for the shortest delay and 32% for the longest delay (z 
= -1.98, p < .05, see Table 1).  The effect was not sustained in Levels 2 through 4 where the 
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predicted preferences for “long” responses were 49% and 53% for the shortest and longest delay, 
respectively (z = .66, p > .05).  
Importantly, there was a statistically significant effect of the length of the delay to 
maximal damage on sensitivity to the power parameter (i.e., a Power  log(Delay) interaction, z 
= 2.02, p < .05, see Table 1).  For example, in Levels 2 through 4 participants were more 
sensitive to the current power value when the delay to maximum was only 5 s (predicted “long” 
response Ms = 77% for a power of 0.5 vs. 21% for a power of 1.5) than when it was 20 s 
(predicted “long” response Ms = 67% for a power of 0.5 vs. 38% for a power of 1.5).   
The individual differences variables (sex and self-reported video game play) had little 
effect on performance.  Only the reported amount of third-person video game play was retained 
as a predictor of the likelihood of producing a long IRT (greater than half the delay to maximum) 
with those who reported the most (a score of 6) having a 22% chance of producing a “long” 
response and those who reported the least (a score of 0) having a 54% chance of producing a 
“long” response (z = -3.11, p < .01).   
Discussion 
The observation of a magnitude effect in this very different preparation for the study of 
impulsivity both broadens the generality of the original reports and further validates the 
escalating interest task as a measure of impulsive responding.  The effect of the length of the 
delay on sensitivity to the consequences of shorter versus longer IRTs (via the power parameter) 
was small but somewhat surprising.  Our participants’ behavior showed greater differentiation as 
a function of the power value for shorter delays than for longer delays.   
The discounting of reward magnitude is often well-described by Mazur’s (1987) 
hyperbolic model: 
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V =
DamageIRT
1+ k ´ IRT
 (1) 
where V is the discounted value of the programmed amount of damage delivered (DamageIRT; see    
Figure 1) for a given IRT and k is a free parameter that varies directly with sensitivity to delay; k 
is often estimated independently for each individual.  Using Equation 1, the left side of Figure 6 
depicts hyperbolic discounting across a 20 s span with a k of 0.25.  An outcome that reaches its 
maximum value at 5 s will have been significantly discounted relative to its value if it had been 
available immediately.  However, an outcome that reaches its maximum value at 20 s would 
have been discounted even further.  The relative amount of discounting for these two delays is 
more clearly evident on the right side of Figure 6 where each curve is scaled by dividing by its 
maximum (5 s vs. 20 s).  This latter figure suggests that in general, participants should wait a 
greater proportion of the delay for short delays than for long delays.  As Table 1 and Figure 5 
show, this result was observed only in Level 1 suggesting that participants assigned to conditions 
with longer delays adapted to them.  Indeed, Figure 5 reveals that the principal change in 
behavior was a shift toward longer IRTs in later game levels for the participants assigned to the 
longer delay conditions consistent with their learning to exhibit less impulsive responding in the 
presence of longer delays.  
 With regard to the weaker sensitivity to the power contingency for longer delays to 
maximum, initially this behavior may have been driven by the generally low likelihood of 
waiting in the presence of long delays (see Figure 5).  However, when the delay to maximum 
was short, the dynamics of the reward magnitude (i.e., how quickly the charge bar changed) may 
be more evident than when the delay to maximum was long.  As Figure 2 shows, the difference 
that a few seconds of waiting makes to the outcome magnitude is much greater for short delays 
than for long delays when the power is less than 1.00.  The opposite is true for power greater 
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than 1.00, but this difference is less dramatic due to the asymmetric nature of the superellipsoid 
function that was governing the recharge rate.   
Our findings suggest that both magnitude effects and an increased sensitivity to 
discounting contingencies for short delays occur within the context of an escalating interest 
video game task.  The first result suggests that the difficulty with observing magnitude effects in 
nonhuman species is not merely a byproduct of the shorter experienced delays in the tasks used 
in nonhuman studies nor the use of hypothetical monetary rewards in human studies.  
Furthermore, the magnitude effect did not interact with our delay contingencies (via the power 
parameter) nor the delay to maximum damage, thus establishing its independent effect on 
behavior.  Finally, our manipulation of the delay to maximum reward served to generalize the 
original report of Young et al. (2011) by establishing control by the power parameter at delays to 
maximum reward that were both shorter and longer than those originally reported.  
Although we have placed the present results within the context of research on delay 
discounting, the escalating interest task more closely resembles a delay of gratification (DG) task 
(Mischel, 1966; Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) in which the smaller sooner reward is available 
throughout the delay thus allowing for the possibility of defection while waiting.  Given that we 
have not uncovered any research on magnitude effects using a DG task, our results extend 
demonstrations of participants’ waiting longer for larger magnitudes into related paradigms 
involving a delay to reward.  Furthermore, the DG paradigm usually involves delays of many 
minutes (Forzano, Michels, Carapella, Conway, & Chelonis, 2011; Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) 
although studies using other species show experimental control with much shorter delays (e.g., 
Reynolds, de Wit, & Richards, 2002).  
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Differences among species are readily apparent and not surprising, but it is too easy to 
jump to conclusions that imply a qualitative difference.  It is important to choose tasks that 
conform to the abilities and ecological niches to which a species has adapted.  Because most 
adult humans are not currently living in environments where a few seconds of delay of food, 
money, or an opportunity to mate has survival significance, it should not be surprising that there 
is little discounting of these rewards compared to that of other species where competition for 
basic needs is much more fierce.  Thus, using an environment where seconds do matter for 
humans provides a better test case for identifying whether certain variables are differentially 
affecting humans and nonhumans. 
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Table 1. Regression Weights for the Best Fitting Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model of 
Dichotomized Interresponse Times.  
 Level 1 SE Levels 2-4 SE 
(Intercept) 2.23
*
 0.81 2.26
*
 0.18 
Power -1.13
*
 0.22 -2.04
*
 0.17 
Log(Delay) -0.62
*
 0.31 0.13 0.29 
Magnitude -0.02 0.29 0.71
*
 0.27 
Power  Log(Delay) 0.91
*
 0.38 0.89
*
 0.34 
 
Note: The link function was the logit. 
*
 p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Left: Three examples of the superellipsoid functions generated by Equation 1 of Young 
et al. (2011) using a power value of 1.5 (top curve), 1.0, and 0.5 (bottom curve).  Right: The 
damage rates produced by these power values for a consistent delay between responses.  
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Time (s) 
Figure 2.  Examples of the growth in damage for short, intermediate, and long delays (5 s, 10s, 
and 20 s) across 20 s if the participant waited until full charge for each choice.  The left graph is 
for positive acceleration (power = 0.5), the middle graph for linear acceleration (power = 1.0), 
and right graph for negative acceleration (power = 1.5).   These curves are those produced by the 
standard magnitude condition with damage scaled to 100% of the standard (43.33 pts). 
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Figure 3. Mean likelihood of waiting more than half the programmed delay to maximum reward 
for each participant in the standard and double magnitude conditions.  Smoothed spline fits are 
included to ease readability; higher lines indicate a higher probability of waiting for that 
participant and a more negative slope indicates a greater sensitivity to the changing 
contingencies of waiting. 
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Figure 4. Probability density curves of sample of scaled IRTs (1.0 = delay to maximum charge) 
for the standard magnitude condition and the double magnitude condition in Level 1 and across 
Levels 2 through 4.  Note that these plots are functionally equivalent to smoothed frequency 
histograms, thus the plots go below zero due to smoothing.  
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Figure 5. Probability density curves of a sample of scaled IRTs (1.0 = delay to maximum 
charge) for the 5 – 8 s delays (short dashes), 9 – 12 s delays (short-long dashes), the 13 – 
16 s delays (long dashes), and 17 – 20 s delays (solid line) in Level 1 and across Levels 2 
through 4. Note that these plots are functionally equivalent to smoothed frequency 
histograms, thus the plots go below zero due to smoothing. 
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Figure 6. Plot of hyperbolic discounting (left) and a replot of these discounting effects when the 
delay to maximum value is plotted on a relative scale (right).  See text for a more complete 
description. 
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